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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs CASE NO. 
JUDY BAXTER, SQUAW PEAK, INC.,· 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment, granting an injunction 
in favor of plaintiff-respondent Utah County, against defen-
dant-appellant Judy Baxter, wherein defendant-appellant Baxter 
was enjoined from further maintaining an eating, beer selling, 
conunercial establishment on the property in question. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-appellant Judy Baxter was enjoined from main-
taining an eating, beer selling, commercial establishment, in 
conformity with a beer and commercial license, on the lot in 
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question, by Judge J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, on the 26th day of March, 1980. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant-appellant Judy Baxter seeks a reversal and set-
ting aside of the District Court injunction, thus allowing her 
to continue to maintain the eating, beer selling, commercial 
establishment, without unlawful interference from Utah County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
From 1935 until 1977, the land upon which the Riverbend 
Inn was located was zoned for commercial use. Since 1935 there 
has been a commercial enterprise located there, selling beer 
and food. Several years ago, prior to 1976, defendant-
appellant Judy Baxter acquired the property and the business 
of the Riverbend Lounge. 
In 1976, the Utah County Commission passed a revised zon-
ing ordinance, to go into effect in January 1977. (T.R. 30) 
That particular ordinance rezoned the property in question to 
a critical environmental zone. Under such ordinance, no com-
mercial uses were to be allowed as well as no selling of beer. 
However, the county commission did allow for nonconforming 
uses in said zone if they existed prior to a certain time. 
In March 1953, a caretaker home for the business, the 
Riverbend Lounge, was built. (T.R. 31) That home is also a 
nonconforming use under the revised zone. (T.R. 31,35) (This 
fact was also admitted in plaintiff's Amended Complaint.) 
-2-
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On January 17, 1978 (misstated as 1977 in trial), the 
business known as the Riverbend Lounge was destroyed by fire. 
(T.R. 34,42) Mrs. Iva Snell, the head of the Department for 
Building Inspection and Zoning Enforcement and Business Regu-
lation for Utah County (T.R. 25), at the time of the fire, in-
formed defendant-appellant Judy Baxter, hereinafter referred 
to as defendant-appellant, that according to the zoning 
ordinances of Utah County, there had to be a structural re-
model or replacement within 12 months of the destruction. 
(T.R. 48) 
In compliance with the above, defendant-appellant went 
to Ron Parker, an employee of the county, employed in the 
Building Inspection and Zoning Enforcement (T.R. 33,34) on 
November 15, 1978 and applied for a building permit to remodel 
the caretaker home. Mr. Parker filled out the building permit 
and defendant-appellant apprised him of the fact that she was 
going to sell beer from the caretaker home, remodeled into a 
lounge. (T.R. 45) Mrs. Snell and Mr. Parker both knew that 
the purpose for the remodeling was a conunercial establishment 
to sell beer. (T.R. 45, 51, 55 and 57) 
Ron Parker and Iva Snell were informed by defendant-
appellant that she had spent $3,500 to $4,000 to remodel the 
caretaker house, at the time of the building permit applica-
tion. (T.R. 46) 
In mid December 1978, with the remodeling complete, 
defendant appellant paid $312 to Utah County for a beer 
-3-
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license renewal, which amount the county accepted. (T.R. 39, 
47) The former beer license was still in effect at the time 
of the above renewal. (T.R. 49) 
Finally, on July 30, 1979, plaintiff-respondent returned 
defendant-appellant's check for $312 to her and told her at the 
time, some seven months later, that they were denying defendant-
appellant her beer license; consequently, according to them, 
defendant-appellant could no longer sell beer. Then, on or 
about November 7, 1979, the plaintiff-respondent finally filed 
an action to close defendant-appellant down entirely, includ-
ing her commercial and beer license. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO DENY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
In the plaintiff's amended complaint, it was alleged 
that "defendant's continued failure and refusal to cease and 
desist from such violation will result in irreparable harm to 
Utah County ... " In paragraph 11 of that same complaint, 
plaintiff-respondent stated that the continued violation of 
a county ordinance was detrimental to the County of Utah and 
its inhabitants in that it"frustrates the comprehensive plan 
for the development of the county ... " At no time during 
the trial was any evidence elicited or put forth by plaintiff-
respondent to in any way reflect that the plaintiff had suf-
fered irreparable injury or harm because of their allegation 
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that defendant-appellant had failed and refused to cease and 
desist from an alleged violation of the zoning ordinance. 
Further, plaintiff never attempted to put on any evidence 
that any alleged violation of the county zoning ordinance was 
detrimental to Utah County nor was there evidence produced by 
plaintiff that such an alleged violation-frustrated any com-
prehensive plan. It is such a basic and fundamental rule of 
law that the evidence deduced at trial must conform to the 
pleadings and that those matters plead must be proven at trial 
in order for plaintiff to receive the relief for which he prays, 
that to cite authority for that proposition would almost be re-
dundant. Further, as will be shown in the other arguments con-
tained in this brief, it is absolutely essential and necessary 
in order for a plaintiff to obtain an injunction that plaintiff 
must plead and prove irreparable injury and harm to themselves. 
Since the granting of an injunction usually takes away the 
property rights of a defendant, the pleading and proving of 
irreparable injury is even more compelling. Otherwise, defen-
dant would be deprived of constitutional rights guaranteed to 
her. 
Henson v. Payne, 302 S.W.2d 44,51 (Mo. 1956), was a suit 
for an injunction to restrain a defendant religious faction 
from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession of church 
property by attempting to construct a building on the church 
premises. Since plaintiffs did not prevail at the trial level, 
they filed an after-trial motion to amend the judgment, which 
-5-
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motion included among other things that "the judgment entered 
is contrary to all of the evidence adduced . . n The Supreme 
Court of Missouri, in answer to that argument stated in part 
that "the decree must conform not only to the evidence but to 
the pleadings." (Emphasis added) In the instant case, the 
decree rendered by the trial court did not conform to the 
pleadings, especially to paragraphs 11 and 12. At page 53 of 
the trial record, the court stated, "All right, then the county 
rests?" The county replied, "Yes, Your Honor." At that time 
counsel for defendant-appellant moved the court to dismiss the 
complaint on file and then additionally stated that "I don't 
think the county has shown any detriment to the county." Where-
upon, the court queried, "Do they have to?", to which counsel 
for defendant-appellant replied, "Well, they plead it." To 
that the court replied, "As a matter of fact, I've precluded 
it." (T.R. 53,54) Since plaintiff-respondent did not attempt 
to;nor offer any evidence whatsoever dealing with irreparable 
injury to the county even though they had plead the same, and 
the judge held that they did not have to, because he had pre-
cluded it, the decree entered by the trial court did not con-
form to paragraphs 11 or 12 of the pleadings filed plaintiff. 
In Haiku Plantations Association v. Lono, 529 P.2d 1,3 
(Haw. 1974), an action was conunenced by plaintiffs who were 
the owner-lesses of a subdivision wherein they sought to en-
join the owner of an easement from parking vehicles in and 
around their subdivision. There, the court stated, "All of 
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the material allegations of the complaint in the absence of an 
answer thereto, must be deemed to have been denied by [the de-
fendant] and therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs 
to prove each of these allegations by the requisite proof to 
be entitled to any injunctive relief." In the instant case, 
all of the material allegations of the amended complaint were 
denied specifically by defendant-appellant and therefore in 
order for the plaintiff to prevail, it had the burden to prove 
each of the allegations contained in their amended complaint. 
Since the court did not require them to do so, reversible error 
was committed and injunction should not have issued. 
In Pugmire v. Oregon Shortline R. Company, 92 P. 762,767 
(Utah 1907), the court was confronted by a situation which was 
in reverse to the one in the instant case, but which would be 
applicable to the case above. There the court stated: 
"[T]he plaintiff should have been limited in 
her proof to the injuries alleged in her com-
plaint. This was not done. Permitting the 
plaintiff to introduce the evidence objected 
to naturally tended to take the defendant by 
surprise and to prove an element of damages 
of which it had no notice." 
As this applies to the instant case, the defendant-appellant 
was put on notice by plaintiff's amended complaint, that plain-
tiff intended to prove irreparable injury and harm to the county 
as well as frustration of a comprehensive zoning plan, which 
would be detrimental to Utah County. Therefore, since plain-
tiff did not have to prove the detriment to Utah County because 
of the frustration of the comprehensive plan; nor more impor-
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tantly, since they did not have to prove irreparable injury in 
order to obtain an injunction, defendant was taken by surprise 
and had no advance notice. Such surprise and lack of notice 
really deprived defendant-appellant of her rights of due pro-
cess. 
In Sinclair Refining Company v .. Wyatt, 149 S. W. 2d 353, 355 
(Mo. 1941), it was stated, "In an equity case, the decree must 
conform not only to the evidence but also to the pleadings." 
Finally, in Friedel v. Bailey, 44 S.W.2d 9,15 (Mo. 1931), 
it was held that "this court is limited to the issues contained 
in the pleadings. The decree must conform not only to the evi-
dence but also to the pleadings." 
Therefore, as is stated in the above-cited cases, it is 
absolutely essential that the decree in the instant case con-
form to the pleadings. Since the decree entered by the trial 
court, did not conform to paragraphs 11 or 12 of plaintiff-
respondent' s amended complaint and a fortiori, since an essen-
tial element to the obtaining of an injunction, is to plead 
and prove irreparable injury, such a failure on the part of 
the trial court to have the decree conform to the pleadings 
should result in reversible error. Therefore, plaintiffs-
respondents are not entitled in any way to have an injunction 
issued against defendant-appellant. 
Further, by pleading irreparable injury and harm, plain-
tiffs put defendants on notice that they were prepared to 
prove that at the time of trial. It is logical to assume, 
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therefore, that defendant-appellant would naturally prepare to 
meet that argument of irreparable injury, Since the trial 
court did not require plaintiffs to prove such, defendant-
appellant would not have been prepared to meet such a turn of 
events at the trial court level. Consequently, there is a com-
pelling due process denial since defendant-appellant was taken 
by surprise. 
Finally, the following two cases should be brought to this 
court's attention. In La Bellman~ Gleason & Saunders, Inc., 
418 P.2d 949 (Okla. 1966), the court stated: 
"Jurisdiction of the trial court is limited 
to the particular subject matter presented by 
the pleadings, and any judgment which is beyond 
the issues framed by the pleadings and proof 
is in excess of the court's jurisdiction and 
is void." 
Secondly, a somewhat recent pronouncement by our own 
court is stated in Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976): 
"While the rules countenance liberality and procedure in the 
granting of relief to which a party is shown to be entitled, 
this does not go so far as to authorize granting relief on 
issues neither raised nor tried." 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE BUSINESS 
TO THE HOME ENLARGED THE NONCON-
FORMING USE. 
The facts which are pertinent to this argument are that 
the nonconforming use, prior to its destruction, was between 
6,000 and 8,000 square feet in size. (T.R. 48) The original 
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nonconforming use was used as an eating establishment and a 
place where beer was dispensed. (T.R. 35,36) After the de-
struction of the nonconforming use, defendant-appellant trans-
ferred the business, which was an eating establishment and a 
beer dispensing business, to a home located several feet from 
the site of the original nonconforming use, the square footage 
of said home being 850 square feet. (T.R. 36) In other words, 
defendant-appellant maintained exactly the same type of busi-
ness as she had in the nonconfo·rming use prior to its destruc-
tion when she transferred that business to the house. The only 
difference being that the house was comprised of less square 
footage, by approximately six to eight times less, than that 
of the original nonconforming use. Defendant-appellant did not 
in any way change the nature or character of her business by 
making such a move and did not enlarge said business. She was 
compelled to move the business to the only structure on that 
parcel of ground in order to maintain her beer license and keep 
it active, in order that said beer license could be renewed. 
Further, it was brought out at trial by the county's wit-
ness, Iva Snell, that the home to which the business was trans-
ferred was originally built and used as a caretaker home for 
the nonconforming use, prior to its destruction. (T.R. 31) 
As if to underscore that, Mrs. Snell was asked whether or not 
the caretaker home for the business was located there and to 
which she repliedtyes'! In other words, the home would never 
have been built if there had never been a business on that 
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parcel of ground. The home was there solely for the purpose of 
the business and as will be further amplified below, that fact 
is critical. 
It was also brought out at trial that the business which 
was destroyed was a nonconforming use and that the home, locat-
ed on the property, was also a nonconforming use to the zone in 
which the property was located. These facts were also admitted 
in plaintiff-respondent's amended complaint. 
In City of Silisbee 5 Herron, 484 S.W.2d 154,156,157 
(Civ.App.Tex. 1972), the court set forth certain tests as to 
whether a nonconforming use is valid. One test used is whether 
or not the use is the same before and after the zoning restric-
tion becomes effective. The court also stated that "certain 
construction changes or increases have been permitted where 
the basic use is not changed." Finally, the court stated, "Per-
haps the most understandable and easily applied test is that an 
existing use should mean the utilization of the premises so 
that they may be known in the neighborhood as being employed 
for a given purpose. 11 Applying this to the instant case even 
though the issue is not the establishment of a nonconforming 
use, is that defendant-appellant used the original nonconform-
ing use to sell food and beer. After the destruction of the 
original nonconforming use and the transfer of the business to 
the 850 square foot house, the use was to sell food and beer. 
The basic use never did change. Applying the last test, above 
stated, the original nonconforming use was known in the neigh-
-11-
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borhood as a place for the sale of food and beer. After that 
business was transferred to the home, the use was still known 
in the neighborhood as being a place for the sale of food and 
beer. The only thing that had changed after the destruction 
of the original nonconforming use, was the site of the busi-
ness--it had moved several feet to the east of the original 
nonconforming use. Even so, the transferred business was still 
the same type of business except that it was now established 
on a smaller scale, which was necessitated by the small scale 
of the remodeled home, which became a lounge. The neighborhood 
still knew that it was a place where food and beer could be 
purchased. 
In Zoning Board of Adjustment v. Lawrence, 309 S.W.2d 883, 
884,886 {Civ.App.Tex. 1958), it was found that the entire tract 
was used as a veterinary clinic at the time of the enactment 
of the zoning ordinance which did not permit such use. It was 
also found that Lawrence had moved one building 150 feet and 
joined that to another building at the cost of $15,000. Even 
though the zoning ordinance in question spoke in terms of a 
structural alteration when applied to a nonconforming use the 
court found that the nonconforming use could be continued, even 
in light of the above facts since no structural alterations 
were made. That case is analogous to the case at bar. Defen-
dant-appellant used all of the parcel of land, where the ori-
ginal nonconforming use was lo'cated, as part of the business 
of selling food and dispensing beer. The land around the 
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original nonconforming use was used for parking and the home 
located just east of the original nonconforming use was put 
there solely as a caretaker home for the business. Had the 
business not been there, the home would not have been built as 
a caretaker home for the business; therefore, the entire tract 
was used for the purposes of maintaining the business. In 
view of Lawrence, supra, the fact that defendant-appellant 
moved the business from its original situs to the remodeled 
home, now lounge, does not mean that defendant-appellant sur-
charged the original nonconforming use, even though said use 
was established in a different location on the tract of land. 
In City of Wichita Falls v, Evans, 410 S.W.2d 311,313 
(Civ.App.Tex. 1967), the court was confronted with the fact 
that the building from which the business had been transacted 
was originally a small structure so located on the tract that 
there was room to construct a new building thereon without re-
moving the old. Evans erected a new building and then took 
the stock of goods from the old structure and placed them into 
the new structure and continued the business from the new struc-
ture. Then the old building was renewed. The situs of the 
new building was approximately one foot from the site of the 
old, but was placed on a new foundation. The applicable zon-
ing ordinance spoke in terms of conducting a business from the 
"same location." Therefore, the court had to construe the 
meaning of "same location" to see whether or not the above-
mentioned change conformed to the ordinance. The court held 
-13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that even though a change had been made, the business was still 
being conducted from the same location. 
That case is appositeto the case at bar, especially since 
the facts are similar. The remodeled home, now lounge, was 
located only a few feet from the site of the original noncon-
forming use and the same or similar stock of goods being sold 
in the destroyed nonconforming use were sold in the newly re-
modeled lounge. In other words, the nature of the business had 
not changed even though the location had, a minimal amount. 
The Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County states in part, 
"Nevertheless, a nonconforming building or structure of use of 
land may be continued to the same extent and character as that 
which legally existed on the effective day of the applicable 
regulations." The ordinance in addressing itself to a damaged 
or destroyed nonconforming building or structure states in 
part, "[S]uch restoration shall not increase the floor space 
devoted to the nonconforming use over that which existed at the 
time the buildin~ became nonconforming." The ordinance does 
not address itself to the question of whether or not the re-
stored nonconforming use has to be located on the exact site of 
the destroyed nonconforming use. Also, in the case at bar, the 
floor space devoted to the restored nonconforming use was not 
anywhere near 6,000 to 8,000 square feet as was contained in 
the destroyed nonconforming use. In fact, as has already been 
mentioned, the floor space of the restored nonconforming use 
was only 850 square feet. Yet the plaintiff-respondent would 
-14-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have the trial court and this court believe that such a ~rans­
fer to a nonconforming building which was less than one-sixth 
of the original floor space of the destroyed nonconforming use, 
was a change in the extent and character of the original non-
conforming use. Such a view is preposterous. In fact, Mr. 
Burningham, a deputy Utah county attorney, stated to the court 
that "we have other reason [sic] for getting her stopped." 
(T.R. 65) This shows that the plaintiff was not really inter-
ested in whether or not defendant-appellant had in any way. 
changed the extent and character of the prior nonconforming 
use. 
Since defendant-appellant had a prior nonconforming use 
which was· destroyed and transferred that same use to a loca-
tion, smaller in size than the original and on the same parcel 
of ground and dispensing the same products, she necessarily 
had a vested right in that nonconforming use. To divest her 
of that right, without any proof whatsoever on the part of 
plaintiff that the extent and character of the prior noncon-
forming use had changed is to deny defendant-appellant of her 
property without due process of law, as is guaranteed to her 
by the constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United 
States. Kensmoe v. City of Missoula, 480 P.2d 835,838 
{Mont. 1971). 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v, North Salt Lake City, 19 Ut.2d 329, 
431 P.2d 559,564 (1967), dealt with land owners who desired to 
use their property for sand and gravel excavation. North Salt 
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Lake City tried to enforce two of its zoning ordinances and 
one excavation ordinance in order to compel the discontinuance 
of the use of plaintiff's property for sand and gravel opera-
tions. The court was called upon to determine the validity of 
the provisions of the ordinances as applied to plaintiff's op-
erations on the property. Even though this case deals with 
the excavation of gravel, which is somewhat different from the 
facts in the case at bar, the logic used therein, would be ap-
plicable to the case at hand. There, this court ruled that be-
cause of the very nature and use of an extraction business 
that the entire tract "is generally regarded as within the 
exemption of an existing nonconforming use, although the en-
tire tract is not so used at the time of the passage or ef fec-
ti ve date of the zoning ordinance." Drawing an analogy to the 
instant case, it can be argued that even though the entire par-
cel or tract of land wherein the destroyed nonconforming use 
is located either directly or indirectly was used for the en-
hancement of defendant-appellant's business operation, the use 
of a different location, within the same tract and not many 
feet from the original destroyed nonconforming use, would in 
no way change the extent and character of the destroyed noncon-
forming use. 
The facts show that defendant-appellant planned to sell 
food and beer from the 850 square foot remodeled lounge just 
as she had so done with the destroyed nonconforming use. The 
fact that the remodeled lounge used to be a home does not 
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really change the extent and character of the destroyed non-
conforming use. She still dispensed the same items to the 
public, the people surrounding the area knew that the destroyed 
nonconforming use was a place in which to purchase food and 
beer and that the same could be purchased from the smaller 
remodeled lounge. It would be an entirely different case if 
defendant-appellant had tried to use that parcel of ground in 
a manner totally unrelated to the items dispensed from the 
prior nonconforming use. That never happened--the only thing 
different was that a home had been remodeled into a lounge, 
the lounge is only 850 square feet and that lounge is located 
several feet to the east of the original nonconforming use. 
Since the ordinance does not require that any restorations 
must be built on the same situs of the prior nonconforming 
use, it is submitted that a move to a slightly different loca-
tion on the property, but still dispensing food and beer, is 
not a change in extent and character. In fact, defendant-
appellant' s restored operation was on a much smaller scale, 
born out of necessity of having to locate in a smaller build-
ing. Such fact demonstrates that she conformed to the require-
ments contained in the Utah County ordinance dealing with non-
conforming buildings and uses. Such ordinance is appended to 
this brief as Appendix No. 1. 
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III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING 
PLAINTIFF TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE 
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND HARM AND 
ALSO ERRED BY GRANTING AN INJUNC-
TION WITHOUT REQUIRING PLAINTIFF 
TO PROVE THE SAME. 
At the time plaintiff closed their case in chief, nowhere 
in that case did they present any evidence whatsoever that by 
allowing defendant to continue her business operation would re-
sult in irreparable injury and harm to plaintiff, Utah County. 
Yet, in spite of that fact, plaintiff was in court to seek a 
permanent injunction against defendant's operation of a beer 
and eating establishment on that property. As is stated in 
42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions §48, "The very function of an injunc-
tion is to furnish preventive relief against irreparable mis-
chief or injury . The mere assertion that apprehended 
acts will inflict irreparable injury is not enough. The com-
plaining party must allege and prove facts from which the 
court can reasonably infer that such would be the resttlt." 
(Emphasis added) The fact that no injunction can be granted 
unless there is a showing of irreparable injury or harm is a 
well grounded and fundamental rule of law. Because the trial 
court failed to dismiss plaintiff's complaint at the close of 
their case in chief because they did not offer any evidence 
whatsoever to support a showing of irreparable injury the 
court very erroneously granted the injunction to close down 
defendant's eating and beer selling business. 
In Jivelekas ~City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419,423 (Wyo. 
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1976), plaintiffs sued the City of Worland for damages caused 
to their home by a sewer backup, alleging that defendant was 
negligent in the planning, construction and maintenance of its 
sewer line. Plaintiffs wanted injunctive relief to compel the 
city "to take necessary steps to replace the sewer line." The 
court held: 
"Since there is no liability, there can, of 
course, be no injunctive relief. Before in-
junctive relief will be granted the thing 
complained of must have caused actual injury 
and the cause must be orove-iand identified .. 
'It must be a material-and actual injury, 
existing or presently threatened, and not 
one that is fanciful, theoretical, or merely 
possible, or that is doubtful, eventual, or 
contingent.'" 
In the case at bar, no proof was submitted to the court by 
plaintiff that there w~s a material or actual injury whether 
presently existing or threatened. The court, therefore, cannot 
grant an injunction because any injury alleged by the county 
is fanciful, theoretical or merely possible. In fact plain-
tiff could not in any way show any irreparable injury or harm 
to themselves which would be different from any, if at all, 
deriving from the business venture of the prior nonconforming 
use, even if it had not been destroyed. Plaintiffs could com-
plain that the irreparable injury they suffered was a frustra-
tion of the comprehensive plan for the development of the county 
as set forth in the applicable zoning ordinance. Yet nowhere 
in the trial did plaintiff present any evidence as to the com-
prehensive plan for the development of the county nor was any 
evidence deduced by plaintiff as to any frustration of the com-
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prehensive plan. In fact, plaintiffs would be hard pressed to 
show that the restored nonconforming use frustrated the compre-
hensive plan for the development of Utah County any more so 
than the original destroyed nonconforming use had that business 
not been destroyed. However, such an argument is inapplicable 
since plaintiffs did not in any way put forth any evidence to 
support that allegation. 
In Venegas v. United Farm Workers Union, 15 Wash.App. 858 
552 P.2d 210 (1976), tenants of a labor camp brought a claim 
for injunctive relief against a labor union, which the court 
denied, stating: 
"Tenants of the labor camp have failed to make 
a clear showing of necessity for injunctive 
relief against continuing organizational activ-
ities by the UFW. Therefore, the court had no 
duty to issue the injunction. Absent irrepara-
ble injury, there is no abuse of discretion in 
the denial of injunctive relief." 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs have failed to make a clear 
showing of necessity for injunctive relief against defendant 
for the continual operation of her business out of the remodeled 
lounge. Therefore, the trial court below, had no duty
1 
in fact 
was in clear error to issue the injunction to close down de-
fendant-appellant. Not only did plaintiff fail to show any 
necessity for the injunctive relief, as was before stated, they 
failed to show irreparable injury. In Henson, supra, the court 
denied plaintiff's request for an injunction because the evi-
dence did not show irreparable damage to plaintiffs. The 
court also held: 
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"It is the purpose of an injunction to restrain 
actual or threatened acts which constitute a 
real injury and is to be used sparingly in 
clear cases only, and the decree should be so 
framed as to afford the relief to which com-
plaintant is entitled, and not to interfere 
with legitimate and proper action on part of 
those against whom it is directed." 
As was before stated, there was never any showing on the 
part of plaintiff or the evidence deduced at the trial that 
plaintiff had suffered any real injury. In Berryman ~ Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 416 P.2d 387,388, 
389 (Nev. 1966), the court held that "injunctive relief is not 
available in the absence of actual or threatened injury, loss 
or damage. There should exist the reasonable probability that 
real injury will occur if the injunction does not issue." The 
court in that case, denied the injunction since plaintiffs had 
incurred no damage or injury, actual or threatened. 
As concerning the instant case, no reasonable probability 
that real injury would occur to the county if defendant-appel-
lant continued in her business venture, was cited. 
Again, in Agronic Corporation of America ~ deBaugh, 21 
Wash.App. 459, 585 P.2d 821,824 (1978), the court held that 
the "essential elements which must be shown before an injunc-
tion will be granted are necessity and irreparable injury." 
Amplifying that, the court stated: 
"A party seeking an injunction must 'show a 
clear legal or equitable right and a well-
grounded fear of immediate invasion of that 
right.' Furthermore, the acts complained of 
must establish an actual and substantial in-
jury or an affirmative prospect thereof to 
the complainant .... " 
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The purpose of an injunction is not 
to punish a wrongdoer for past actions but 
to protect a party from present or future 
wrongful acts. A court should not issue an 
injunction when the harm it will do to a 
defendant is disproportionate to the damage 
caused a plaintiff by the action he asks 
be injoined." 
In the case at bar, plaintiff did not in any way show any 
essential elements prior to the granting of an injunction in 
his behalf. Nowhere in the evidence, considered in plaintiff's 
case in chief, was there anything dealing with the necessity of 
an injunction or irreparable injury done to plaintiff. Yet, 
the trial court granted an injunction which granting, runs 
counter to the well-established rules of law regarding the 
elements which must be shown before an injunction will be 
granted. Further, plaintiff failed to show a clear legal or 
equitable right and also failed to show a well-grounded fear 
of irrunediate invasion of that right. In addition, plaintiff's 
proof was void of any actual or substantial injury or even 
an affirmative prospect of any kind of actual and substantial 
injury. Nowhere did plaintiff seek to protect the county from 
any present or future wrongful acts of defendant. In accord 
is KAKE-TV and Radio Inc. v. City of Wichita, 516 P.2d 929,935 
(Kan . 19 7 3 } . 
There have been several pronouncements by the Supreme 
Court of this date regarding the necessary elements to be 
proven in order that an injunction will be granted. Such a 
case is Intermountain Electronics, Inc. ~ Tintic School Dis-
trict, 14 Utah2d 86, 377 P.2d 783,785 (1963). There, plain-
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tiff, who was engaged in the field of cable television, had 
been granted a franchise to operate a TV system in the town 
of Eureka. The defendant's school district, acting under the 
authority of a Utah statute, contracted with a company to in-
stall, on a high peak in Juab County, a television translator 
which would receive, amplify and rebroadcast signals from orig-
inating television stations, making the signals available to 
people in the surrounding area. Action was commenced by Inter-
mountain Electronics to restrain the installation of the trans-
later station, it being alleged that plaintiff had made a sub-
stantial investment in installing its special TV system; that 
it had an exclusive franchise in Eureka and numerous contracts 
with local subscribers and that valuable property rights would 
be destroyed and irreparable injury would ensue if the plan of 
the defendants was carried out. The Utah court was not im-
pressed. It ruled: 
"The fundamental question is whether the plain-
tiff asserts a valid basis for prohibiting 
the defendants from proceeding with the pro-
posed project. To justify doing so, it is 
not sufficient that plaintiff claim irrepara-
ble injury to its property, but there must be 
some actual or threatened violation of its 
rights by a wrongful act of the defendants." 
This honorable court also cited with approval Jackson v. 
Harward, 9 Utah2d 136,137, 339 P.2d 1026 (1959). The long 
standing law, in the state of Utah, is that not only is it 
not sufficient that plaintiff claim irreparable injury to its 
property, but there must also be a showing of some actual or 
threatened violation of its rights by a wrongful act of the 
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defendant. As has been stated many times in this brief, in 
the instant case, plaintiff at the time of trail never did 
claim nor prove any irreparable injury, a fortiori, they did 
not even show any actual or threatened violation of their 
rights by any wrongful acts on the part of defendant-appellant. 
Therefore, an injunction should never have been granted by the 
trial court and by its granting, the trial court committed an 
eg·regious error. 
That rule, extrapolated by the Supreme Court of this 
state, is further amplified in Crescent Mining Co. v Silver 
King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 P. 244,248 (1898). The court 
stated: 
"The power to grant injunctions to prevent in-
justice has always been regarded as peculiar 
and extraordinary. It is not controlled by 
ordinary and technical rules, but the applica-
tion for its exercise is addressed to the con-
science and sound discretion of the court. 
Ordinarily, it will not be exercised when the 
v/right of the complainzant is doubtful, and has 
not been settled at law~ and, even when it has 
been so settled, an injunction will not be 
granted when the remedy at law is adequate. 
It is not enough that an injury merely nomin-
ally or theoretically is apprehended, even 
although an action at law might be maintained 
for it; but, to justify the interposition of 
this summary power, there must be cause to 
fear substantial and serious damage, for which 
courts of law could furnish no adequate remedy." 
(Emphasis added) 
In accord, is Gulf, C.&S.F.RY.Co. v White, 281 S.W.2d 
441 (Civ.App.Tex. 1955). Also, Gibbons & Reed, supra. 
As has been amply shown, not only by the Supreme Court of 
this state, but by authority from other jurisdictions, the 
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granting of the injunction against defendant-appellant, Judy 
Baxter, was clearly erroneous absent any showing of necessity 
and irreparable injury on the part of plaintiff. 
B 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
BALANCE THE CONVENIENCES PRIOR 
TO GRANTING THE INJUNCTION IN 
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
By their very nature, equity courts should always be 
solicitous to work out the equities and justice of the case 
before them. 
"Generally, courts are not bound to make a 
decree that will do more mischief and work 
greater injury that a wrong which is asked 
to redress. Thus, if the circumstances are 
such that the injunction would bear heavily 
on the defendant without benefitting the 
plaintiff, it will usually be refused, as 
where the inconvenience and injury to the 
plaintiff are not of a pressing character, 
and the result would be to cause a large 
loss to defendant." 42 Am Jur 2d Injunctions, 
§56. 
As was before stated, defense counsel, at the close of 
plaintiff's case in chief, moved the court to dismiss plain-
tiff's action since plaintiff had failed to prove any irrepar-
able injury. Since the court failed to grant said motion to 
dismiss, the court never inquired into the onerous burden to 
be born by defendant while comparing the benefits of the in-
junction to the plaintiff; hence, it committed reversible 
error. The above-cited rule from Am Jur 2d is in accord with 
the decision reached in Huggins v.Wake County Board of Educa-
tion, 272 N.C. 33, 157 S.E.2d 703,709 (1967). Also, Barber 
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~School District, 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.Ct.App. 1960). In the 
instant case, since plaintiffs did not prove any irreparable 
injury to themselves if defendant continued in her business, 
then certainly the fact that the injunction closed down defen-
dant, deprived her of a property right and destroyed her means 
of livelihood certainly displays the fact that the injunction 
weighs very heavily on defendant and in no way is beneficial 
to the plaintiff, since it really does not make any difference 
whether defendant engages in this business in the original non-
conforming use and now in the replaced nonconforming use. In 
other words, plaintiff is not affected by the continuation of 
defendant's business, whether it be the original nonconforming 
use or the reconstructed nonconforming use. 
This rule of "balancing conveniences" is· a well-estab-
lished and fundamental rule of law. In Grey~ Mayor, etc., 
of City of Paterson, 60 N.J.E. 385,45 A.995,998 (1900), the 
court held: 
"' [T]hat an injunction ought not to be granted 
when the benefits secured by it to one party 
is of little importance, while it will oper-
ate oppressively and to the great annoyance 
and injury of the other party, unless the 
wrong complained of is so wanton and unpro-
voked in its character as properly to deprive 
the wrongdoer of the benefit of any consider-
ation as to its injurious consequences, 1 ••• 
In the case before us, the injury to the de-
fendants would be so great that an injunction 
should not be granted to these complaintants." 
In the instant case, the benefit to be secured by the 
plaintiff by obtaining the injunction is of so little importance 
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to them, that they never even bother to put on any proof as 
to any irreparable injury suffered by them if the injunction 
would not have been issued. On the other hand, the injunction 
has operated and will continue to operate so oppressively and 
so injuriously to defendant, that there is a high likelihood 
that the defendant will have to suffer bankruptcy. The opera-
tion of the business was the defendant's only real means of 
livelihood and since she has been deprived of that means of 
livelihood, plaintiff has realized very little benefit. As 
was before stated, plaintiff's injury, if at all, is extremely 
incidental and so comparatively small that they did not even 
bother to ascertain what the injury would be. 
The precedent.of this jursidiction is in accord with the 
above-cited authority. In Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King 
Mining Co., 17 Utah, 444, supra, the court held, "If the 
granting of an injunction would necessarily cause great loss 
to the defendant,--a loss altogether disproportionate to the 
injury sustained by the plaintiff,--that fact should be con-
sidered in determining whether the application should be 
granted; and in some cases it would justly have great weight." 
In Gibbons and Reed, supra, the court would not grant an 
injunction in favor of North Salt Lake City. Part of the con-
sideration in arriving at that decision, was the fact that 
"the record indicates that the fair market value of plaintiff's 
property would be reduced from almost $86,000 to approximately 
$39,000. In addition to that, the plaintiff would be unable 
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to utilize sand and gravel deposits of a value approximating 
one million dollars." Applying that reasoning to the case at 
hand, if defendant were unable to utilize the parcel of land 
in question, for the sale of beer or food or for any other 
commercial activity, the value of that parcel would drop sub-
stantially. This is another consideration which the trial 
court failed to take into account in granting plaintiff the 
injunction plaintiff sought. In accord is Agronic, supra. 
IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT SINCE PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPEED_~·FROM 
REVOKING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S 
BEER LICENSE AND COMMERCIAL 
LICENSE AND FROM SEEKING THE IN-
JUNCTION FOR WHICH THEY PRAYED. 
Due to the conduct of plaintiff-respondent directed to-
wards defendant-appellant at the time that defendant-appellant 
applied to Utah County for a building permit and paid the re-
quisite sum as well as in December 1978, wherein defendant 
paid to the county the sum of $312 for the beer license (T.R. 
38) , plaintiff should have been estopped from revoking defen-
dant's beer license and from seeking the injunction which was 
granted to them by the trial court. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comrnmission, 
602 P.2d ·689,690,694,695 (1979), involved a situation where 
the Liquor Control Conunission represented to the liquor license 
applicant that the applicant's plot plan complied with the 
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statute prohibiting the issuance of such licenses to clubs 
located within a radius of 600 feet of any public or private 
school, and applicant, in reliance upon such representation, 
thereafter expended upwards of $200,000 to complete the con-
struction of the club. The court there, held that the Liquor 
Control Commission was estopped from denying the license on 
the ground that the applicant's facilities did not comply with 
the 600-foot requirement. In reaching that decision, the 
court enumerated the elements which are essential to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. These elements are set 
forth as follows: 
"l. An admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted, 
2. Action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement, or act, and 
3. Injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such admission, statement, or act." 
In Celebrity, supra, the agents of the commission advised 
the owners of the club as to the appropriate alterations to the 
premises which the petitioner followed. 
In dealing with this doctrine of equitable estoppel, the 
court went on to state: 
"The conduct of government should always be 
scrupulously just in dealing with its citi-
zens; and where a public official, acting 
within his authority and with knowledge of 
the pertinent facts, has made a commitment 
and the party to whom it was made has acted 
to his detriment in reliance on that commit-
ment, the official should not be permitted 
to revoke that commitment." 
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Amplifying the above ruling, 42 Arn Jur 2d, Injunctions 
§61, states as follows: 
"Remedy by way of injunction will not generally 
be granted in favor of one who, with full know-
ledge of what is being done or with means of 
acquiring such knowledge, is acquiescent or 
delays in asserting, or neglects to assert, his 
rights until defendant has placed himself in a 
position from which he is unable to extricate 
himself without great injury or damage." 
(Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the facts indicate that the· doctrine 
of equitable estoppel is applicable. During the trial, plain-
tiff called Iva Snell to the witness stand. When asked what 
her occupation was, Miss Snell replied that she was the head 
of the Department for Building Inspection and Zoning Enforce-
rnent and Business Regulation for Utah County. Then in answer 
to the question propounded to her by plaintiff as to what her 
duties were, she replied that part of her duties were to "make 
sure that permits that are issued comply with the zoning ordin-
ance." In effect, Miss Snell, as an agent of the county, had 
the authority to advise applicants as to whether or not by way 
of their application they were in compliance with the zoning 
ordinances of Utah County. Even though much was stated by 
plaintiff that defendant Baxter, in making the application for 
a building permit, referred to that building as a single family 
home, Miss Snell admitted that Ron Parker, who is also an agent 
of the county and also worked in her department, as well as 
taking defendant Baxter's application for the building permit, 
that Mr. Parker knew what the purpose of the single family 
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dwelling was, i.e., that it was to be used as a loungz from 
which beer and food would be dispensed. (T.R. 57) Miss Snell 
also admitted that Mr. Parker told her this and that they had 
a discussion regarding that, at a time almost contemporaneous 
to the issuance of the building permit and accepting the $312 
from defendant Baxter for the renewal of the beer license. In 
fact, defendant Baxter testified that she told Ron Parker, the 
above-referred to agent of Utah County, that her purpose in 
remodeling the single family residence was so that it could be 
modified to the point that it would become a lounge from which 
beer and food would be dispensed. Also, that the closets which 
were marked as such on the plans submitted to him should have 
been marked as coolers. {T.R. 45) 
When cross-examined by counsel for defendant, Baxter, Miss 
Snell stated that she could have been present at the time when 
defendant Baxter walked into the off ice to apply for and obtain 
the building permit. (T.R. 33) As was before stated, Miss 
Snell admitted that Mr. Parker knew what the purpose of the 
single family residence was, and that she was apprised by Mr. 
Parker what that purpose was, i.e., that it was to be used as 
a lounge to dispense beer and food. {T.R. 57) As a result of 
the building permit application, said building permit was 
issued to defenda~t Judy Baxter on November 15, 1978. The 
issuance of such permit was inconsistent with later denying 
defendant the ability to so operate the lounge, especially to 
sell beer; in light of the fact that Miss Snell described her 
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duties as making certain that the permits which were issued 
complied with the zoning ordinance.- She, more than anyone 
else, should have been aware at the time the building permit 
was issued whether or not said issuance of the permit, would 
violate the zoning requirements. Thus, the first element that, 
as was set forth in Celebrity, supra, has been met--an act 
which was inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted. 
Miss Snell's act of issuing the building permit, especially in 
view of her duties, as well as a month later accepting a check 
for $312 for a renewal of defendant's beer license and then 
seven months revoking the beer license and the commercial 
license constituted inconsistent acts. 
. . 
As to the second element enumerated in Celebrity, supra, 
since these above-ref erred-to agents of the county were aware 
of defendant's intent to remodel the home in order to construct 
a lounge from which to sell beer and food, then by allowing 
defendant to so proceed, created reliance in the mind of de-
fendant Baxter to the point that she expended from between 
$12,000 to $15,000 to effect such remodeling. (T.R. 44) 
In meeting the third element, above enumerated, defendant 
Baxter has suffered much injury as a result of the inconsistent 
positions asserted by plaintiff. Her injury is that she has 
lost the $12,000 to $15,000 in the remodeling, and has lost 
an indeterminate amount of business, which has nearly bank-
rupted defendant, simply because she relied upon Miss Snell's 
failure to act as well as any statements made by Miss Snell 
-32-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and Mr. Parker at the time the application was accepted, which 
would lead defendant to believe that she could proceed in a 
manner in which she intended. A fortiori, Miss Snell said 
that she may have told defendant Baxter that she could have a 
commercial business in that remodeled home. (T.R. 55) Such 
a statement by Miss Snell is certainly an act which created 
reliance, justifiably so, by defendant. 
Whether or not the above statement was made by Miss Snell 
is somewhat immaterial in light of the above-cited passage 
from Am Jur 2d. This is so because that passage refers to 
acquiescence once knowledge is acquired. Miss Snell testified 
that she had the requisite knowledge and because part of her 
duties were to ensure compliance with the zoning ordinances of 
Utah County, her failure to deny the permit or even minimally 
to state to defendant that her seeking such permit was in vie-
lation of the zoning ordinances would result in acquiescence. 
This principle of acquiescence, as an element in estoppel, 
is amplified in the statement of this court in Morgan ~ Board 
of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 1976): 
"Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his 
acts, representations, or admissions, or by 
his silence when he ought to speak, inten-
tionally or through culpable negilgence, in-
duces another . . . to believe certain facts 
to exist and that such other . . . acting 
with reasonable prudence and diligence, 
relies and acts thereon so that he will suf-
fer an injustice if the former (Land Board) 
is permitted to deny the existence of such 
- facts." 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It has been born out by quoting the trial record above, 
that minimally, Miss Snell was silent as to whether or not 
defendant was violating any zoning ordinances of Utah County 
when she had a duty to speak in the event of a violation. That 
duty was part of her job as agent for the county. She either 
did not speak intentionally or was negligent, but either way 
her silence when she ought to speak induced defendant to be-
lieve the fact that her building permit and the state of inten-
tion to turn said home into a lounge in which beer and food 
would be dispensed was in compliance with the existing zoning 
ordinances. Such belief was justifiable under the facts. 
Several times throughout the trial, counsel for defendant 
urged the court to apply the doctrine of estoppel in favor of 
defendant so that an injunction would not issue against defen-
dant. 
Since all of the elements enumerated by this court have 
been met, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied 
in this case, to estop plaintiffs from revoking defendant's 
beer license, her commercial license and obtaining an injunc-
tion cgainst defendant. It would appear that plaintiffs are 
guilty of unclean hands; therefore, they should not be allowed 
to take advantage of a situation which they themselves created. 
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v 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANT-
ING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FAVOR 
OF PLAINTIFFS IN VIEW OF THE 
FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE GUILTY 
OF LACHES, DUE TO THE FACT THAT 
THE LAPSE OF TIME CREATED RELI-
ANCE BY DEFENDANT WHICH RESULTED 
IN INJURY TO DEFENDANT. 
It is a well established principle that "equity aids the 
vigilant"; so that relief in that tribunal is confined to those 
who manifest reasonable diligence in asserting their rights 
and demanding equitable protection, and equity will be denied 
to those who sleep upon their rights to the prejudice of the 
party against whom relief is asked. North Carolina Board of 
Architecture v. Lee, 264 N.C. 602, 142 S.E.2d 643,650 (1965). 
In accord, Wolf Brick Co. u Lonyo, 132 Mich. 162, 93N.W. 251, 
252 (1903). 
This principle of laches has peculiar force when the in-
junctive power of the court is invoked. Laches or inexcusable 
delay will not be countenanced when this special form of relief 
is sought. Consequently, remedy by way of injunction should 
not be granted in favor of one "who, with full knowledge of 
what is being done, or with means of acquiring such knowledge, 
is acquiescent, or delays in asserting, or neglects to assert 
his rights while the defendant has placed himself in a position 
from which he is unable to extricate himself without injury or 
damage." Bacon v. Edwards, 214 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1975) B. Ry. Co. 
v. Kirkland, 59 S.E. 220,222 (Ga. 1907). 
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"A party is not entitled to an injunction when, with full 
knowledge of his rights, he has been guilty of delay and laches-
in asserting them and has negligently allowed large expendi-
tures to be made by another party on whom, great injury would 
be inflicted by the grant of the injunction." Kirkland, supra. 
In the instant case, plaintiff, represented by Miss Snell, had 
full knowledge of her rights, especially in view of the fact 
that she was to oversee the granting of permits or licenses 
which would not conflict with the zoning ordinances of the 
county. Through Miss Snell, plaintiff has been guilty of delay 
and laches in asserting their rights, if any they have, by 
waiting from December 1978 until the last part of July 1979 
before informing defendant that her operating the lounge in 
the building which was once a single family residence, was in 
violation of the zoning ordinances, in the county's opinion, 
as it applied to nonconforming uses. Plaintiff county, by this 
delay in asserting their alleged rights, knew that defendant 
Baxter was making large expenditures in reliance upon the state-
ments and acquiescence of the county. In fact, the longer the 
wait by plaintiff, the more the reliance by defendant. Then 
after this great delay by plaintiff, they inform defendant some 
seven months later that her operation is in violation of the 
zoning ordinances of Utah County. Then plaintiff waits an addi-
tional three months before bringing an injunction to force the 
closure of defendant's business. Because of laches, by plain-
tiffs, great injury has been suffered by defendant, especially 
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with the granting of the injunction by the trial court. 
In Bales~ Duncan, 204 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1974), the court 
determined that plaintiff, who had actual knowledge of defen-
dant's plans to convert defendant's residence into a day-care 
center, which knowledge came to plaintiff in August of 1972, 
was guilty of laches in failing to bring suit to injoin said 
use of defendant's home until October 16, 1972, some two 
months later, after defendant had expended circa $15,000 on 
the project. On appeal, The Supreme Court of Georgia held 
that the finding of laches by plaintiff, hence the denial of 
the injunction, was not an abuse of discretion. 
The facts in the instant case are very analogous to those 
in Bales, supra. The building permit granting defendant 
Baxter the right to modify the home into a lounge, was signed 
on November 15, 1978 (T.R. 56) and the check for $312 for the 
beer license renewal was dated December 21, 1978. (T.R. 56) 
Yet it was not until July 30, 1979 that defendant received a 
letter from plaintiff, Utah County Attorney's Office, inform-
ing her that her license for beer could not be issued and re-
turning the previously deposited check. (T.R. 60,61, plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 5) As an aside, in the cormnercial bankin~ 
world, a check more than six months old is a stale-dated check 
and does not have the same rights of negotiability that a 
check which is under six months old has. That tends to show 
that a period of almost seven months is really an unreasonable 
period of time in which to inform plaintiff that her rights 
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to sell beer have been revoked; especially, in view of the fact 
that the longer defendant has waited, the greater the injury 
she has suffered. 
Plaintiff, therefore, slept on their rights for more than 
seven months, during which time defendant expended more than 
$12,000 to $15,000 in reliance upon modifying the single family 
residence and maintaining the beer license. Of these facts, 
plaintiff was aware. (T.R. 44) It would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience, to suffer a party to stand by and see 
these acts done, which necessarily involve defendant's taking 
risks and suffering great expenses and then permit plaintiff 
to enforce his rights by injunction and thereby inflict loss 
and damages on defendant while defendant is acting in good 
faith. 
It was inexcusable for plaintiff to wait these seven months 
before informing defendant that her beer license could not be 
renewed. If, in fact, defendant was in violation of any zoning 
ordinances, this fact should have been readily ascertainable by 
plaintiff, especially since they are the ones who enforce the 
zoning ordinances. 
Further, plaintiff should not have initially misled defen-
dant by accepting her check for $312 for the beer license renew-
al. It would be foreseeable that plaintiff could keep that 
check for possibly two weeks while ascertaining whether or not 
a violation of the zoning ordinances would occur if said beer 
license were renewed; however, a wait of seven months denotes 
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laches on the part of plaintiff. A fortiori, by waiting until 
November 7, 1979 to file suit to injoin defendant from selling 
beer is even a more compelling argument for laches. "Where 
there is inexcusable delay in filing an injunction suit, to 
the prejudice of other parties, laches acts as a bar to such 
action." Mansfield Area Citizens Group v. United States, 413 
F.Supp. 810 (D.C. Pa. 1976). 
In the instant case, as was before stated, Mr. Parker and 
Miss Snell, in their capacity. as agents for Utah County, had 
actual knowledge of defendant's intent to use the modified 
home as a lounge in which to dispense beer and food. On page 
45 of the trial record, lines 10 to 17, there is related the 
fact that defendant Baxter made mention to Ron Parker at the 
time that "I would be selling beer out of the property and 
that's why the bathrooms and the walk-in cooler, or I've got 
closet, should have been cooler, was to be use [sic] and why 
it was remodeled this way." 
Judy Baxter was then asked if Miss Snell said anything at 
that time and defendant replied, "No, she did not." In fact, 
nowhere in the transcript is there record of Miss Snell ever 
informing Judy Baxter that Judy Baxter could not operate her 
business there; yet, Miss Snell herself, listed one of her 
duties as "making sure that any permits issued are in compli-
ance with the zoning ordinances." (T.R. 25) 
From the transcript it can be ascertained, from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff knew what the in-
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tended use of the single family residence was, i.e., a lounge 
from which beer and food would be dispensed. Furthermore, Miss 
Snell admitted that she may have told defendant Baxter that she 
could operate a commercial business there. (T.R. 55) 
The doctrine of laches will be applied in cases where 
there is a lapse of time without seeking relief by injunction, -
to the extent that defendants are injured. Larreca v. Van 
Orden, 346 A.2d 922 (Pa.Commonwealth 1975). In that case, 
plaintiffs waited nine months after the initial announcement 
of a project to expand a township building before filing their 
complaint seeking to injoin the construction of such project 
and where during such period of time, said township retained 
and compensated an architect for the purpose of expanding the 
township building. There, the above-cited court ruled that 
the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of laches. 
The general rule of law in regard to the use of the doc-
trine of laches in cases where equitable relief is prayed for, 
is that the equitable remedy of an injunction must be applied 
for with reasonable promptness. Martin,et.al. ~Adams County 
Area Vocational Technical School Authority, et.al., 313 A.2d 
·785 (Pa.Commonwealth 1973); Brandon, et.al.~ Stover & Pickle, 
447 S.W.2d 195 (Ct.App.Tenn. 1969). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is a very basic and fundamental rule of law that the 
evidence deduced at trial must conform to the pleadings and 
that those matters plead must be proven at trial in order for 
any plaintiffs to receive the relief for which they pray. 
Further, in order for a plaintiff to obtain an injunction, it 
is absolutely essential and necessary that plaintiffs must 
plead and prove necessity and irreparable injury and harm to 
themselves. This is especially essential since the granting 
of an injunction, especially in the case at bar, robs defen-
dants of any property rights; consequently, resulting in great 
injury to defendants, especially in this instant case. Atten-
dant thereto, is a compelling constitutional argument, that 
to require otherw-ise would deprive defendant of her constitu-
tional rights of due process, wherein she is put on notice by 
the pleadings, that she denied each and every allegation in 
those pleadings and therefore was taken by surprise when the 
very essential element in obtaining an injunction did not have 
to be proved in conformity with said pleadings, as was decided 
by the trial court. 
In the instant case, and contrary to the great weight of 
authority, the decree rendered by the trial court did not con-
form to the pleadings. As such, the court erred in granting 
an injunction in favor of plaintiff. According to the cases 
above cited, that is the law in this state. 
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Defendant-appellant did not enlarge the nonconforming use, 
which was maintained in the destroyed building, by transferring 
said use to the modified home located a few feet away from the 
original use. Defendant-appellant maintained the same type of 
business, that of selling beer and selling food, the only dif-
ference being that the modified lounge was much smaller and was 
located a few feet away from the original nonconforming use. 
As was brought out during the trial, that parcel was used to 
enhance the original nonconforming use. Most of the parcel was 
taken up in parking and for the home, which was used as a care-
taker home for the business, prior to its destruction. Had 
there been no business located there, the home would not have 
been built there. In fact, the move by defendant-appellant to 
the modified home conformed to the express requirement of the 
Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County wherein it was stated 
that "such restoration shall not increase the floor space de-
voted to the nonconforming use over that which existed at the 
time the building became nonconforming." Certainly 850 square 
feet in no way enlarged or increased the floor space devoted 
to the original nonconforming use. The ordinance does not 
address itself to the question of whether or not the restored 
nonconforming use has to be located on the exact site of the 
destroyed nonconforming use. There is an applicable maxim to 
the effect that "that which is not specified is deemed to be 
excluded." That statement speaks for itself. Another compel-
ling fact is that the people in the neighborhood knew that 
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that parcel was used as a place to dispense food and beer, 
which is the use for which the parcel had been put to prior 
to the destruction. Nothing had changed except the location. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the transfer 
of the business of the prior nonconforming use, later destroyed, 
to the home, enlarged that nonconforming use, hence is in vio-
lation of the zoning ordinances of Utah County. Such a con-
clusion by the trial court is totally erroneous. 
Since the very function of an injunction is to furnish 
preventative relief against irreparable injury, it is absolute-
ly essential that a plaintiff must prove irreparable injury in 
order to obtain the relief for which they have prayed. Such 
is a fundamental rule of equity. By failing to dismiss plain-
tiff's complaint at the close of their case in chief, because 
they did not of fer any evidence whatsoever to support a showing 
of irreparable injury, the court committed error. Such error 
is very prejudicial and has seriously injured defendant-appel-
lant. 
The injury complained of must be an actual injury and the 
cause must be proven and identified. It cannot be one that is 
fanciful, theoretical, or merely possible, or that is doubtful, 
eventual, or contingent. However, in the instant case, the 
above adjectives are inapposite, since plaintiff never offered 
one shred of evidence as to any injury. In addition, plain-
tiffs in their amended complaint allege that defendant's con-
tinued operation of the business in the modified home frustrated 
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the comprehensive zoning plan of Utah County. Again, plain-
tiffs failed to put on any evidence to support that allegation 
and the trial court committed reversible error in not dismiss-
ing plaintiff's case at the conclusion of their evidence, 
since they failed to so prove that allegation. Absent a show-
ing or irreparable injury and harm, an injunction cannot be 
granted by the trial court. Similarly, plaintiffs failed to 
·show any necessity for injunctive relief. Such requirement is 
an element which must be proven in order for plaintiffs to re-
ceive injunctive relief. 
It is noteworthy that in addition to the above, no reason-
able probability that real injury would occur to the county if 
defendant-appellant continued in her business venture, was in 
any way proved by plaintiff. As is required by the case law 
of Utah, the plaintiff in the instant case must not only claim 
irreparable injury, but there must also be a showing of some 
actual or threatened violation of plaintiff's rights by a 
wrongful act of the defendant-appellant. Since this was not 
done, the trial court grievously erred by not dismissing plain-
tiff's cause of action at the end of their presentation of the 
evidence, when urged by defendant's counsel to do so. 
Attendant to the necessity of showing irreparable injury 
in order to obtain an injunction, a trial court, in granting 
an injunction, must not only determine whether or not irrepar-
able injury or harm has been suffered by the party seeking the 
injunction, but the trial court must balance the conveniences 
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prior to the granting of any injunction. Because the trial 
court in the instant case failed to do so, it again committed 
error. Clearly, by granting the injunction, the trial court 
created more mischief and worked a greater injury to defendant 
than the wrong whib.h was asked by plaintiff to be redressed. 
The injunction has born heavily on the defendant, in that she 
is unable to operate her business, after a large expenditure 
of money in reliance upon the acts and acquiescence of plain-
tiff. This injunction bears heavily on defendant but does not 
really benefit plaintiff, since no evidence was offered by 
plaintiff to show that plaintiff's inconvenience and injury 
are of a pressing character. In fact, the injury to plain-
tiff was of such a minimal consequence that they did not even 
see fit to in any way offer any proof of the existence of any 
injury. Again, it really does not make any difference to 
plaintiff whether or not defendant engages in this business 
in the modified residence or continued to engage in the busi-
ness in the original location of the destroyed nonconforming 
use. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence that the 
trial court balanced any of the benefits to be realized by 
plaintiff against the hardships or burdens to be placed upon 
defendant if an injunction was going to be granted. Such a 
balancing has been referred to in many jurisdictions as the 
balancing of conveniences. Such a balancing of conveniences 
is such a well established and fundamental rule of law, that 
an injunction should not be granted by a court of equity in 
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an absence of any balancing of such conveniences. Because the 
trial court did not require the plaintiffs to put on any evi-
dence regarding whether or not they would receive a benefit if 
the injunction were granted or whether or not they would suffer 
irreparable injury if it were not granted, the trial court's 
decision is clearly contrary to the law of this state as well 
as the long, well-established authority cited in the Utah cases, 
dealing with this very issue. Therefore, this injunction should 
never have been granted by the trial court. 
As was stated in Celebrity, supra, the elements which must 
be proved in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
are: (1) An admission, statement or act inconsistent with the 
claim afterwards asserted; (2) Action by the other party on the 
faith of such admission, statement or act; and (3) Injury to 
such other party resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act. All 
of these elements are present in the instant case; therefore, 
the trial court erred by not invoking the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel against plaintiffs. Plaintiff should have been estopped 
from seeking and injunction, because they created the situation 
which led to the creation of the circumstance, which in their 
minds they felt must be injoined. Here, there is ample evidence 
to show that a public official or officials, acting within their 
authority, had knowledge of pertinent facts and then either by 
an act or by acquiescence made a commitment and that the defen-
dant, as a result of the act and/or acquiescence has relied to 
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his detriment on that comment, act or acquiescence; therefore, 
the plaintiffs should not be permitted to revoke the business 
and beer license of defendant, since she relied on their acts 
and/or inaction. As was brought out during the trial, plain-
tiff's agents were fully aware of the amount of money defen-
dant-appellant expended in reliance upon Miss Snell and Mr. 
Parker's statements. In fact, Miss Snell even testified that 
she could have told defendant-appellant that she could operate 
a commercial enterprise, i.e., that of selling beer and food 
out of the remodeled home, now a lounge. For the trial court 
not to estop plaintiff from revoking defendant's commercial 
and beer licenses, after hearing such evidence, is totally in-
excusable; especially, where defendant's counsel urged the 
trial court to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. It is note-
worthy that Miss Snell testified that part of her duties, as 
agent for plaintiff, Utah County, was to ensure that any per-
mits and licenses issued were to conform to the presently ex-
isting zoning requirements of Utah County. 
As was stated in Morgan, supra, by this very court, estoppel 
should arise when the plaintiffs, by their acts, representations, 
or admissions, or by their silence when they ought to speak, in-
tentionally or through culpable negligence induces defendant to 
believe that her reconstructed business conforms with the zoning 
ordinances of Utah County as relating to reconstructed noncon-
forming uses and since this belief of conformity is justifiable, 
a fortiori, even is willing to spend large sums of money, cer-
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tainly plaintiff should be estopped from the revocation and 
injunction it sought. 
Equally compelling, is the fact that plaintiff waited for 
such a long time before informing defendant that her beer li-
cense and commercial license had been revoked after seeing the 
amount of money defendant spent in reliance on plaintiff's acts. 
Certainly the trial court erred in granting the injunction 
through plaintiffs since it is obvious that by waiting seven 
months to inform defendant of the revocation and an additional 
three months before filing suit for injunction, that plaintiffs 
had slept on their rights, and because plaintiffs were guilty 
of laches and unreasonable delay, the court erred in granting 
said injunction. Plaintiffs had the knowledge and wherewithal 
to immediately enforce their rights, did they feei that their 
rights would be trammeled by the issuance of the permits and 
licenses to defendant. The periods of time, which the plain-
tiff took in order to enforce their rights, if any existed, 
was completely unreasonable and inexcusable. This is especially 
compelling where it is a governmental agency which either in-
tentionally or negligently induced the reliance of defendant. 
Therefore, defendant-appellant, urges this court that it 
may find that the trial court erred in the points of law, as 
enumerated in this brief and revers~ the granting of the injunc-
tion by the trial court, in favor of the plaintiffs, so that 
defendant may again resume her business of dispensing beer and 
food in the reconstructed nonconforming use. Also, that this 
-48-
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honorable court find that the reconstructed nonconforming use 
does not enlarge the destroyed nonconforming use; hence, would 
be found to comport to the requirements of the revised zoning 
ordinances of Utah County. Further, that defendant be placed 
in the same position that she enjoyed in December 1978, so 
that she may in some way recoup the losses she has suffered 
as the result of the revocation and injunction imposed upon 
her by the trial court, with a finding that the trial court 
acted erroneously, so that defendant-appellant may again rea-
lize the property right which she has had, which has been de-
prived her in an unconstitutional manner. Due to the great 
amount of injury suffered by defendant-appellant, defendant-
appellant respectfully prays that this court will rule that 
the injunction was erroneously granted and may further rule 
that defendant-appellant be allowed to again resume the sell-
ing of beer and food in the home, now modified into a lounge. 
Respectfully submitted this 
day of November, 1980. 
HANSEN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, 
Judy Baxter 
by 
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APPENDIX 
10.02.0700 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
02.0701 Intent 
The intent of this section is to accumulate provisions applying to 
all land and buildings within the unincorporated areas of the county 
into one section rather than to repeat them several times. 
02.0702 Nonconforming Buildings and Uses 
In view of the fact that no further development or change in use 
can be undertaken contrary to the provisions of this ordinance, it 
is the intent of this ordinance that nonconforming uses shall nor 
be increased nor expanded except where a health or safety official, 
acting in his offfcial capacity, requires such increase or expansion 
Such e~nsion shall be n::.J~-~~ter than that which is required to 
comply with the trf:1riimum requirements as set forth by the heal th or 
safety official. Nevertheless, a nonconforming building or structuI 
or use of land may be continued to the sq..!l1~~_1;:_Eln_La_11 __ s};l_a~cter as 
that which legally existed on the effective day of the applicable 
regulations. Repairs may also be made to a nonconforming building 
or to a building housing a nonconforming use. 
A. Damaged Building may be Restored--A nonconforming bµilding 
structure and a building or structure occupied by a noncon_ 
ing use which is damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, or o 
calamity or act of nature may be restored, and the buildin: 
structure or us~ of such building, structure, or part ther 
may be continued or resumed, provided that such restoratio· 
started within a period of one year from the date of destr 
tion and is diligently prosecuted to completion. ~ch res 
tion shall not increase the floor space devoted to the non 
forming use over that which existed at the time the buildi 
became nonconf orrnin"i] 
B. Discontinuance or Abandonment--A nonconforming building or 
structure or portion thereof or a lot occupied by a noncon 
ing use which is, or hereafter becomes, abandoned or is di 
tinued for a continuous period of one year or more shall n 
thereafter be occupied, except by a use which conforms to 
use regulations of the zone in which it is located. 
C. Change to a Conforming Use--Any nonconforming building or 
which has been changed to a conforming building or use sha 
not thereafter be changed back to a nonconforming use. 
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10.02.0400 INTERPRETATION 
In interpreting and applying this Ordinance, the provisions thereof 
shall be held to be the minimum requirements needed to promote the 
public health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity, and 
general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the county. 
Except as specifically provided herein, it is not intended by the 
a~~!L.O.L.th-U__.Q~.QJnaJ!f_~_j:o repeal, abr..o_gat...e._annul or in ~nY_~ay_ 
to .. impail:-..o.L-.in.t:.e.d~~ _:'!i th a~l~~_!-~_t:..!E.8_£!?.Y~.~-!?..?.~.-~ ?,_~ --~aw.#~r . -· 
o:~i~ance, .. 9fa'. ..• any t:ul.~~-l-!.~~~'=~-~;'.~E..~F~-~ts_ p_rev.io\lsJY.._ad'(?p,E.Ead 
or iss~e_c;l _gr__~~j.-~~-~-~-~-~.J._1Q.~--~cl9l2.~.~~i_~E,-.. ~ssued pursua11._t __ to law 
rera-ting to .the __ .§rection, construct;i.ort,.. .. est~blishme~t,\.._moving, --
alteration or enl~rgement---oTany·-·b~ilding or improvement ;,.,_no:t:....is, 
n-rntended· by tnis~Orainance··c-a~int~~Ter·~ ·with ·o:r··~b·r;;g~te or 
annul any easement, covenant or other agreement between parties; 
provided, however, that in cases in which this Ordinance imposes a 
greater restriction than is imposed or required by other existing 
provisions of law or ordinance, then in such case the provisions of 
this Ordinance shall govern. 
Enacted effective September 9, 1970. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
upon the Utah County Attorney's Office, Courthouse, Provo, 
Utah, 84601 this day of November, 1980. 
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